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Abstract
Debate on the nature of representation in cognitive systems tends to oscillate
between robustly realist views and various anti-realist options. I defend an altern-
ative view, deflationary realism, which sees cognitive representation as an offshoot
of the extended application to cognitive systems of an explanatory model whose
primary domain is public representation use. This extended application, justi-
fied by a common explanatory target, embodies idealisations, partial mismatches
between model and reality. By seeing representation as part of an idealised model,
deflationary realism avoids the problems with robust realist views, whilst keeping
allegiance to realism.
Keywords: Cognitive Representation; Naturalising Intentionality; Scientific Mod-
els; Deflationary Realism; Idealisation; Indeterminacy of Content
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1 Introduction
A guiding principle that has marked most of cognitive science since its birth about 70
years ago is the idea that cognition is made possible, at least to a large extent, by
internal computational processes that manipulate internal states that bear representa-
tional content. Much philosophical work has been dedicated to exploring the notions of
representation and computation, with an eye especially to accounting for them in purely
naturalistic, scientifically-acceptable ways. This computational-representational frame-
work is no longer the ‘only game in town’, with interesting alternatives being developed
by proponents of embodied and enacted cognition that often downsize, and sometimes
eliminate, appeal to representation and/or computation in explaining cognitive capa-
cities. At any rate, that framework plays to this day an important role in informing
contemporary research in the cognitive sciences, and in light of this continuing relev-
ance, philosophical interest in the nature of cognitive representation and computation
goes on.
In this paper I focus on the notion of representation in cognitive science. Philosoph-
ical work on representation has blossomed in the ’80s and ’90s, but since the turn of
the century interest seems to have waned (Godfrey-Smith 2006). The main candidates
for a naturalistic theory of representation — informational semantics, inferential role se-
mantics, and teleosemantics — all seem to face crucial difficulties; and the solutions put
forward have failed to convince all, resulting in a lack of consensus and diminishing trust
on the prospects of success of the naturalisation project. In the past years, however, hope
has returned, and there has been a renewed interest in shedding light on the notion of
representation. Some provide fresh developments of teleo-based theories (Neander 2017,
Millikan 2017, Shea 2018); while others have aimed at exploring alternative views of the
nature and role of representation in the cognitive sciences (Godfrey-Smith 2006, Sprevak
2013, Egan 2014, Coelho Mollo 2020).
Here I will follow the latter path, suggesting a different way of understanding cognit-
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ive representations in light of recent philosophical work on the nature and role of models
and idealisations in science. In a nutshell, I will argue that cognitive representations
are part of an idealised explanatory model, the representational model, whose primary
domain of application is the practices surrounding the use of external representations.
Despite containing idealisations in its application to cognitive phenomena, I hold that
the representational model captures actual features of cognitive systems: features that
are relevant for explaining certain patterns of behaviour that call for representational
explanation, which I call representational patterns. These considerations invite a realist
view of representation, although one in which troublesome commitments of traditional
theories are seen as idealisations, thereby deflating their metaphysical import. I call the
resulting view ‘deflationary realism’.
Here is how I will proceed in what follows. In section §2 I provide a rough taxonomy
of the main views on the ontological status of representation. I explore the features of
the representational model in section §3, arguing that representational explanation has
its origins in the social practices sustaining public representation use, and that it has a
privileged explanatory target, i.e. representational patterns. In section §4 I analyse the
limits of the representational model when applied to cognitive systems. I put forward
my alternative view of representation, deflationary realism, in section §5, and I argue
that it avoids the problems with traditional views of representation. Finally, I contrast
it with other recent deflationary approaches, content pragmatism and fictionalism, as
well as with robust realist views, showing that deflationary realism is a distinct view
(section §6).
2 Representation in Cognition
A promising approach to representations is to see them as theoretical posits that play
an explanatory role in the cognitive sciences (Cummins 1989, Coelho Mollo 2015, Shea
2018). In the cognitive sciences, representations are typically seen as internal, often
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subpersonal states that are about entities and processes in the world, in a way not
too dissimilar to how pictures are about what is depicted, words are about what they
refer to, and maps are about the landscapes they map. Representational contents place
conditions on how the world is or should be, if the representation is, in a loose sense, to be
appropriate. By being about things in the world, representations stand in for what they
represent, and by operating over their own representational states, cognitive systems
are able to produce behaviour that is appropriate to the circumstances the organism
finds itself in. The physical realisations of representational states are representational
vehicles: the physical states that bear representational content. In the case of the brain,
representational vehicles are ultimately states and processes going on in neurons and/or
in populations of neurons (and possibly in glia), although this does not mean that
explanations in representational terms need be cashed out in neurophysiological terms
1.
A crucial contrast that sets apart different approaches to representation in the cog-
nitive sciences is between views that insist that cognitive representations are theoretical
posits that refer to real, objective entities in cognitive systems; and views that deny it.
I will refer to the former as realist views, whilst I will call the latter anti-realist views.
Cognitive representations, by the realist’s lights, really exist within cognitive sys-
tems. The notion is typically posited in the course of attempts to explain cognitive
phenomena and intelligent behaviour, and its explanatory value is supposed to hinge
on its corresponding to features that cognitive systems possess, and would possess even
in the absence of any sentient being having cognitive states about those features, and
independently of the explanatory purposes and practices in which those notions are
employed. For anti-realists, in contrast, the notion essentially depends on conceptual
apparatus that we as cognitive scientists or users of folk psychology impose on the world,
and which is not committed to their being faithful to its nature and organisation.
1For recent debate and defence of the explanatory autonomy of representational, and cognitive
explanation more generally, see the papers collected in Kaplan (2017).
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Some of the most influential realist theories of representation belong to a family
of views that I call robust realism. Robust realists aim at naturalising representation,
explaining the notion in purely naturalistic and non-representational terms. They take
some inner states of cognitive systems to have representational content due to their
standing in some special natural relation(s) to what they represent, which bestows fairly
determinate contents on them. Representations are taken to be structures in the cog-
nitive system whose boundaries are relatively clearly definable, stable, repeatable (i.e.
participate in different cognitive processes whilst preserving the same content), and of-
ten composable (i.e. that can be systematically combined with other representations
to yield more complex representations). Robust realists are also committed to there
being identifiable subsystems whose role it is to use cognitive representations: rep-
resentation consumers. Informational and teleoinformational semantics (Dretske 1981,
Neander 2017), teleosemantics (Millikan 2017), inferential role semantics (Block 1986),
and structural representation (Ramsey 2007, Shea 2018) are examples of robust realist
theories.
Robust realist theories of representation face several objections, and despite decades
of work dedicated to tackling them, it is still unclear whether they can be satisfactorily
addressed. Perhaps the most damning are the various objections from indeterminacy of
content. Briefly, the worry goes that robust realist theories yield representations with
wildly indeterminate, non-unique contents. Representations would thereby have several
simultaneous contents, many of which unrelated to or of a different kind than the content
that would seem as the most intuitive and/or explanatorily apt. Indeterminacy of con-
tent is an unfortunate result for several reasons. First, it seems strongly counterintuitive
when applied to conscious representational states, as they strike us as having determin-
ate contents2. More importantly, indeterminacy of content jeopardises the explanatory
2Determinacy of content is not the opposite of vagueness. Determinate contents may include vague-
ness, for instance if they involve vague concepts, or if the kinds they are about are fuzzy (Millikan
2017).
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role representations are supposed to play, risking to make representational explanation
vacuous or uninformative, and misrepresentation hard to accommodate, or completely
impossible3. A less discussed difficulty for robust realist theories is their commitment to
identifiable and relatively stable representational vehicles and representation consumers.
Issues with vehicle and consumer individuation surface especially in teleologically based
approaches, which currently appear to be the most promising family of robust realist
views (Godfrey-Smith 2006, Cao 2012)4.
On the anti-realist side, a variety of positions withhold ontological commitment to
representations on often different grounds. Some believe that representations do not ex-
ist, or if they do, that they play only a minor explanatory role in the cognitive sciences,
being fruitfully replaced by alternative theoretical posits coming from dynamical sys-
tems theory and neurophysiology (Van Gelder 1995), and/or from alternative, embodied
approaches to cognition (Thompson 2007, Hutto & Myin 2013). I remain neutral on the
prospects of success of anti-representationalist views. My aim in the foregoing is to try
and provide a more satisfactory version of representationalism: deflationary realism. My
view will then have to earn its keep, theoretically and empirically, in comparison to anti-
representationalist alternatives — although, as I point out later (section §7), deflationary
realism removes some of the grounds for seeing the two camps as stark competitors.
Other forms of anti-realism about representation reject ontological commitment to
representations, but hold that nonetheless the notion plays central and/or ineliminable
roles in the cognitive sciences. My deflationary realism bears interesting relationships
to this family of positions, whose most prominent candidates are content pragmatism,
and representational fictionalism.
Content pragmatism sees cognitive representation as part of a gloss that has heur-
3Three indeterminacy problems have been most discussed: the disjunction problem (Fodor 1987), the
distality problem (Dretske 1986), and the functional indeterminacy problem (Fodor 1990). See Ryder
(2009) for an overview, and Neander (2017, chap. 7) for other types of indeterminacy problems.
4This is particularly problematic for consumer-based approaches to teleosemantics, which see repres-
entation consumers as helping determine content. In these accounts, difficulties individuating consumers
infect content determination, being an additional source of indeterminacy.
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istic value, but that makes no ontological commitment to representations (Egan 2014,
Coelho Mollo 2020). On this account, cognitive representations are not posits of cognit-
ive theories proper, but are rather part of the extra-theoretical apparatus that allows us
to connect purely computational explanations of cognition to the externally-individuated
tasks we are interested in explaining. On the other hand, according to representational
fictionalism talk of cognitive representation is a useful fiction (Sprevak 2013), or a form
of pretence (Toon 2016): when making claims about cognitive representations, scientists
engage in fictional discourse — a discourse that works as a useful device for understand-
ing behaviour, but that does not commit us to the reality of cognitive representations.
A central difficulty for both pragmatism and fictionalism is to justify the claim that
representational talk is not ontologically-committing, despite being part and parcel of
our best explanations in cognitive science — in other words, they seem to flout the
principle of inference to the best explanation (Sprevak 2013). I believe that deflationary
realism accommodates some of the insights that motivate pragmatism and fictionalism,
while keeping at bay their problems by sticking to a less-than-robust form of realism. I
compare the three views in section §6.
3 Representational Practices, Representational Patterns
A particularly fruitful way of understanding the explanatory appeal of the notion of rep-
resentation in cognitive science is by recognising its close ties to a model of explanation
that has its original application in the social practices sustaining the use of public rep-
resentations (Godfrey-Smith 2006). This ‘representational model’ is originally targeted
at capturing some of the central features that characterise the use of public symbols by
agents in social interactions, and in everyday life more generally. Clear examples include
linguistic symbols, traffic signs, and city maps.
Representations, on this model, are public objects that agents use in guiding thinking
and behaviour toward something else. Representations act as stand-ins thanks to some
7
property they have that makes them into adequate guides, for specific purposes, and
by agents with the adequate interpretative capacities, to thinking and behaving toward
what is represented. Some typical features of public representations characterise the
representational model: representations are distinct from the agents that use them,
agents intentionally use them as stand-ins for specific entities in specific circumstances,
and there is some relation between the representation and what it is used to represent
that, when correctly interpreted, endows them with determinate contents, allowing this
usage to work adequately enough.
Take a map of Berlin. If it is accurate enough, I can use it to navigate Berlin
successfully, even if I had never been to the city before. The map allows me to move
around Berlin in line with my varying interests and needs during the trip. I may check
the map so as to get to the Pergamon Museum, which stands in my list of attractions to
visit. The map allows me to reach the museum from a variety of different starting points:
a handy property for travellers like me, who enjoy wandering aimlessly around a new
city. It also allows me to reach the museum regardless of variations in other, non-spatial
aspects of my context, such as meteorological conditions, means of transportation (if it is
raining, I may prefer taking public transport rather than walking), and even my desires
and needs (I may want to go to the museum not for the artworks, but rather because I
am meeting a friend there, or because I have been told that the café is excellent and I
am hungry, etc.).
It so happens that I am actually quite familiar with Berlin, and I can reach the
Pergamon Museum successfully and reliably across many different contexts without the
need of a map, or a list of directions, or any other kind of external representation. A
natural move then is to explain this capacity of mine in terms of an internal representa-
tion, perhaps even one that is to some extent similar to a map — e.g. a ‘cognitive map’
in entorhinal cortex (Moser et al. 2008) — that cognitive subsystems use to guide my
behaviour. This is an illustration of the representational model being applied to explain
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a cognitive capacity. The approach consists, roughly, in seeing (some) cognitive states as
guides to states and events in the world, like external representations — with intentional
agents replaced by non-intentional cognitive processes and subsystems that use them in
the appropriate ways (Godfrey-Smith 2006). Application of the representational model
to understanding cognition leads to attempts to individuate the corresponding parts of
the model in cognitive systems. We try, that is, to find in cognitive systems states and
processes that play roles analogous to those of external representations, and of the agents
that interpret and use them. It becomes thus vital to explain how the representational
model can work without making reference to intentional agents and social interpretative
practices. This is the core challenge that realist, naturalistic theories of representation
try to meet: explaining by non-intentional and non-semantic means how cognitive states
acquire content, and in such a way that they can be used as stand-ins by other cognitive
processes (for which appeal to social practices of interpretation is out-of-bounds).
Importantly, the distinctive explanatory target of representational explanation, and
its explanatory role in the cognitive sciences more generally, constrains the ways in which
the representational model is applied to cognitive systems. Representation comes to the
fore when the targets of explanation are certain types of patterns of behaviour, which
we tend to see as intelligent and for which appeal to representation is distinctively
explanatory — i.e. for which appeal to representation leads to better explanations
than would be possible otherwise (Shea 2018, Rupert 2018). I call these explanatory
targets ‘representational patterns’. In order to individuate more precisely the domain of
application of the representational model in the cognitive sciences, we have to look at the
features that its explanatory targets possess in its primary domain of application, that
is to say, the features of the distinctive behavioural patterns that the social practices
tied to the use of public representations make possible.
As we have seen, public representations are objects used as guides for thinking or
behaving toward something else. A city map allows its user to navigate a city, reach-
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ing desired destinations from a variety of different starting points, and regardless of
variations in non-spatial aspects of the situation. The map thereby enables reliable be-
haviour, as it allows one to reach desired locations, and it does so robustly and flexibly,
inasmuch as one can reach them from different points in the city, for different reasons,
and under different environmental conditions. Use of the map leads to reliable and ro-
bust behavioural outcomes5. This, I believe, is one of the characteristic features of public
representations. They enable reliable, robust and flexible interaction between agents and
aspects of the world across a variety of circumstances. They do so in complicated ways,
as the complexity of cartographic representations — which contain approximate spatial
mappings, icons, conventional symbols, etc. — illustrates (Camp 2007, Rescorla 2009).
If one knows a city well, one can navigate the city reliably across many different
contexts without the need of a map, or a list of directions, or any other kind of external
representation. The explanandum in this case, i.e. a certain pattern of (navigational)
behaviour, is sufficiently analogous to the one in the external map case to warrant the
application of the representational model, positing internal states and processes that
function analogously to external maps, i.e. cognitive maps6.
Representations help explain patterns of robust, reliable, flexible behaviour due to
their standing in for what they represent, allowing ‘surrogative reasoning’ (Swoyer 1991).
Representations also help explain why in some cases behaviour reliably fails by appeal
to the falsity or inaccuracy of the representations used. If a map of Berlin wrongly
shows the Pergamon Museum to be in the Tiergarten park, rather than on the Museum
5The degree and kind of reliability, success, and robustness varies depending on the type of repres-
entation and its level of accuracy. A list of written directions from point A to point B is reliable only
from one point of departure, so it is not much robust (although it is robust across non-spatial contextual
variation).
6It may be argued that the similarity between the two cases stems from both involving the use of
a cognitive map, in one case prompted or assisted by an external map, and in the other without such
an external prop. This worry is unwarranted, as the two cases are importantly different. The internal
representations built while using an external map are partial and parasitic on the use of the external
prop, and behaviourally useless without it — an instance of cognitive offloading. In contrast, when
navigating a well-known city without the aid of an external map, successful behaviour is enabled by
rich internal representations that play an analogous guiding role.
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Island, it will reliably and robustly lead its users to fail to reach the museum if that
is their desired destination (if they don’t know better, they will rather robustly and
reliably reach the Tiergarten park) — analogously if the inaccurate map is some sort
of internal representation ‘consulted’ by navigation systems. Correct representation
helps explain successful behaviour — that enters in a representational pattern — and
incorrect representation helps explain unsuccessful behaviour — that patterns in the
characteristically robust and reliable way. This explanatory role is common to both
public and cognitive representations.
Representational patterns consist in the behavioural regularities underscored by
robust, flexible and reliable interactions between complex organisms and their ever-
changing environments across time. Representational explanation is particularly ad-
equate to capturing such behavioural regularities, even in cases in which explanation in
terms of use of external representations is not possible. These distinctive patterns of
behaviour invite the application of the representational model in so far as they bear a
striking similarity to the feats that we, as intentional agents, can accomplish by means
of using public representations. Internal representations can then be appealed to in
explaining those behavioural patterns, in analogy to public representations and the be-
havioural patterns they make possible7.
These considerations make clear that, while the label ‘representational pattern’ may
suggest that this characterisation is circular or uninformative, this is not the case. The
distinctive properties of representational patterns — i.e. behavioural robustness, flexib-
ility and reliability — do not presuppose representations, but rather suggest representa-
tions as the suitable theoretical posits able to explain how those properties come about.
In other words, representational patterns are types of pattern of behaviour that, when
taken as explananda, call for positing representations as their explanantia. (Compare:
7This is not to say that representational explanation cannot be applied to other kinds of behavioural
pattern, such as context-insensitive stereotypical behaviour. The claim is rather that when applied to
behaviours other than those that make up representational patterns, representational explanation may
be less adequate, and it may well play only a heuristic or pragmatic role.
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many diseases exhibit patterns of symptoms and patterns of transmission that are best
explained by appeal to the action of microbes such as bacteria and viruses, but surely
the germ theory of disease was neither circular nor uninformative even before microbes
could be observed.)
More schematically, the main point of this section can be roughly summarised thus
(see also Godfrey-Smith 2006):
1. Agents display patterns of behaviour marked by a high degree of robustness, reli-
ability, and flexibility.
2. Some of these patterns of behaviour are best explained by the use of external
representations by intentional agents; such explanations have specific features that
can be seen as composing a (representational) model of explanation.
3. Other similar patterns of behaviour cannot be explained by the use of external
representations.
4. Given their similarity to the patterns of behaviour explained by external repres-
entations, it is plausible that the adequate model for explaining them is also the
representational model.
5. Therefore, we have good reason to apply the representational model to cognitive
systems by positing internal representations whose nature and function is analog-
ous to that of external representations.
4 Limits of the Representational Model
As I argued in the previous section, once our aim is to explain certain kinds of patterns
of behaviour — which I have been calling representational patterns — application of the
representational model of explanation seems to be a promising way to go. Applying the
representational model to help explain those patterns where public representations are
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not in question, as in many cases of human and non-human cognition, suggests positing
states and processes internal to cognitive systems that play roles analogous to those
of public representations and their users: cognitive representations and representation
consumers. Even though recent work in embodied cognition offers alternative, often
non-representational models for at least some cognitive capacities, application of the
representational model to cognition has proved to be scientifically fruitful, spawning
several fields of research that have been making progress to this day (see Kriegeskorte
& Douglas 2018 for a recent review).
There are however features of public representations that are difficult to square with
how states and processes in cognitive systems work. These are the places in which the
representational model fails to be faithful to its extended domain of application; where
its limitations when applied to the cognitive sciences come to the fore. These are also
the places that invite caution before turning elements of the model into requirements
on the metaphysics of cognitive representation. I do not purport here to give anything
close to a theory of public representations, or of the social practices that underlie their
use. For our purposes it suffices to identify some of their central features so as to see
whether and to what extent they can be shared by cognitive representations. I hope
that the features I will mention are relatively uncontroversial, requiring the adoption of
no specific theory of public representational practices.
First, public representations depend at least partly on intentional agents that take
them to be representations, use them as representations, and are able to interpret them
appropriately. Public representations are also typically intended to function as repres-
entations by their creators. If one wants to stay within a naturalistic approach, appeal
to agents’ intentional states in explaining cognitive representation is off the cards8.
Second, public representations rely on the existence of social practices of interpretation,
8This is so even in naturalistic social- or language-based views, which see intentionality as belonging
primarily to external symbols, and only derivatively to internal states. These accounts typically base
the intentionality of external symbols on non-intentional mechanisms of social conformity (Haugeland
1990, Cash 2009).
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which allow members of a culture to extract the intended meaning from representations.
Since I do not read Japanese, I cannot adequately interpret Japanese linguistic symbols.
There are also less obvious cases: ‘reading’ some kinds of maps, graphs, mathematical
notations, not to mention pieces of art, requires interpretive skills that rely on spe-
cific practices maintained and transmitted by communities. This is another aspect that
cognitive representations cannot share with their public counterparts9.
The traditional solution to these disanalogies is to transform the agents and inter-
pretive practices that underlie public representation use into very simple input-output
cognitive mechanisms following (typically) computational rules (Dennett 1978, Godfrey-
Smith 2006). Such simple mechanisms ‘use and interpret’ only in an extremely watered
down sense: there is no intentionality involved, just the automatic workings of (com-
putational) mechanisms. While this ‘homuncular’ strategy seems to accommodate the
agential and interpretive elements of the representational model in its application to
cognitive systems, there are reasons to be less confident about the details.
Public representations typically have relatively clear boundaries in space and/or
time, at least given appropriate interpretive practices. A sentence has a clear begin-
ning and end (and clear parts), a city map can fit in one’s pocket, and pictures can
be framed and affixed to the wall. Public representations are typically spatially and
temporally delimitable, often portable, and clearly separable from the agent that makes
use of them. In the case of biological cognitive systems, it is doubtful that there are any
neat boundaries to representational vehicles. Candidate vehicles are features of neural
activity in cortical regions, whose representational ‘code’ is still unclear (deCharms &
Zador 2000), as are their boundaries: where the representation begins and ends is a
question with a much less straightforward answer in the case of cognitive systems, given
the complexity of their connectivity structure, and the ubiquity of feedback loops (Cao
9Unless one opts for a social- or language-based view of intentionality. At any rate, under such a view
the practices that underlie representational content must be non-intentional, so as to keep allegiance to
naturalism.
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2012, Artiga 2016). This is not to say that it cannot be answered; and in some sensor-
imotor areas there are populations of neurons that allow some degree of delimitation as
representational vehicles, such as cortical columns in V1.
However, even in their case the situation is rather complicated (Cao 2019). Such
populations have preferred stimuli to which they respond, but they also respond to
other stimuli, although less often and less strongly. Moreover, inhibitory connections to
other populations of neurons play a role in their workings. Should we include popula-
tions of neurons that respond to a certain type of stimulus non-preferentially as part of
the representation? Or what about the populations involved in inhibitory activity? Or
the populations that block or allow such inhibitory activity to go through? And this
without even mentioning neural plasticity, degeneracy and pluripotentiality, and network
reorganisation, which add further layers of complexity and instability to vehicle individu-
ation (Anderson 2014). In other words, individuating representations and their parts
in cognitive systems is rather difficult, and there is no reason to believe that cognitive
representational vehicles can be bounded, even approximately, as public representations
can.
Relatedly, the clear separation between representation and user that characterises
public representations is hardly applicable to cognitive systems. Although the assump-
tion of separability plays a central role especially in teleosemantic theories, where the
distinction between representation producer and consumer helps make the approach get
off the ground, it is unclear whether there is any support for such distinction in cognit-
ive systems (Godfrey-Smith 2006, Cao 2012). For reasons analogous to the above, not
only are the boundaries of representational vehicles far from clear, but so are also the
boundaries of the putative subsystems that use them as representations.
As we have seen, part of what helps fix the content of public representations are
the interpretive practices socially produced and transmitted in a community. These
practices enable users correctly to interpret the content of public representations, using
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them in ways appropriate to what they represent, even in cases where the relationship
between representation and what is represented is very convoluted and opaque, as in
natural language. Public representations typically have determinate, or fairly determ-
inate content because interpretive practices allow representation users appropriately to
grasp the intended content of the representation.
In the case of cognitive representations social interpretive (intentional) practices can-
not be appealed to in helping fix their content, if we are to keep allegiance to naturalism.
It is to this problem that robust realist theories of representation have dedicated most
of their attention. They propose natural substitutes to the interpretive practices that
sustain public representation, in an attempt to show that natural relations and processes
can play a similar role in helping fix the content of cognitive representations. Most of
the debate has focused on which combinations of natural relations and processes are able
to bestow fairly determinate content on representations, as interpretive practices do in
the case of public representations. The failures of existing proposals in this regard are
illustrated by the many indeterminacy problems that have surfaced in the literature.
In brief, application of the representational model to cognitive systems has important
limitations, if taken literally. There are at least three central posits of the represent-
ational model that do not match known properties of cognitive systems or that are
difficult to account for: clearly bounded representational vehicles, the separability of
representation and consumer, and determinacy of content. These mismatches underlie
some of the crucial objections moved against robust realist theories of representation.
Robust realist theories take the representational model seriously, and claim that it is
at least in principle, if not in (future) practice, possible to map its posits into actual
entities and processes in cognitive systems. The failure of such mapping, however, need
not leads us to anti-realism about representation. In the rest of this paper, I explore a
view of representation at odds with both robust realism and anti-realism: deflationary
realism.
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5 Deflationary Realism
Deflationary realism contends that the representational model, when applied to cogni-
tion, is an idealised scientific model. In so far as it embodies idealisations, the model
incorporates falsities. But it does so in order to bring forth the central causal factors
that make the phenomena I have been calling representational patterns possible. Cog-
nitive representation, as a theoretical posit of the model, approximates real properties
of cognitive systems, despite the idealisations it involves.
Contemporary philosophy of science increasingly recognises the significance of models
and idealisations in science, and there is a rich ongoing debate about their nature and
role (Weisberg 2013, Morrison 2015, Potochnik 2017). My understanding of scientific
idealisation is close to Potochnik’s (2017): idealisations are distorted representations
of aspects of a target system, which by means of their partial falsity bring forward
focal causal features of the system relevant to explaining a phenomenon of interest. For
instance, an evolutionary model may assume infinite population size (an idealisation) to
bring into focus the specific contributions made by natural selection to the evolution of
traits within a finite population, disregarding in this way other causal influences such as
genetic drift. Idealisations are, for Potochnik, inevitable in science, given the complexity
of the world, our explanatory aims, and the limitations of our cognitive capacities and
epistemic reach.
Idealised models permeate science: they are essential for achieving central scientific
epistemic aims, such as explanation, prediction, and understanding (Bokulich 2011,
Potochnik 2017). Idealised models are explanatory (at least) in so far as they truly
represent, thanks to the simplifications and distortions they embody, focal patterns of
(causal) dependency that are relevant for explaining a phenomenon of interest. Ideal-
isations are partly false, so that they can be partly true: the falsities they embody
are instrumental for bringing forth actual causal structures of particular explanatory
interest, which would be indiscernible otherwise, lost in the enormously intricate web of
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causal dependencies and factors underlying most real phenomena.
Instead of a true/false dichotomy, which would force idealised models to be simply
seen as false — and thus at most as useful fictions — we can more fruitfully consider
the relationship of model to target partly in terms of degrees of similarity, with some
models saying more true things than others about the modelled systems (Weisberg 2013,
Morrison 2015). Alternatively, we can take idealised models to be true of the causal
patterns they capture, while being false of phenomena as a whole, as they contain
idealisations (Bokulich 2011, Potochnik 2017).
Deflationary realism holds that the cognitive representational model is an idealised
model: a partially distorted and simplified picture of the causal features that contribute
to bringing about the characteristic patterns of behaviour that it aims to explain, namely
representational patterns. There are at least three grounds for taking the cognitive
representational model to embody idealisations. First, as we have seen, it is a model that
has its origins and primary motivation elsewhere. Application of the representational
model to the cognitive sciences features limitations and shortcomings due to the fact
that it is an extension of the application of concepts that belong to one domain —
representational social practices — to a rather different one, that of cognitive states
and processes. Second, cognitive systems are highly complex, and an indeterminate
number of interacting causal factors are responsible for bringing about cognition and
intelligent behaviour. Complex systems can be modelled only partially, and idealisation
becomes crucial to make models tractable, understandable, and epistemically useful
by simplifying some factors and ignoring others. Third, and relatedly, several of the
relevant causal factors for explaining behaviour — e.g. fine-grained neural workings,
evolutionary history — are either currently or in principle epistemically inaccessible to
us. In consequence, we can do little else than to idealise them in our models, in light of
our best guesses, or else idealise or abstract them away.
According to deflationary realism, application of the representational model to the
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cognitive sciences need not, and should not, entail literal commitment to all of the entities
and properties posited by the model. In so far as it embodies idealisations, a degree of
mismatch between the representational model’s commitments and the actual properties
of cognitive systems is inevitable. I take this mismatch to underlie the philosophical
conundra that have plagued robustly realist theories of representation. These arise not
because the theories are incoherent or false, but rather because they fail to recognise the
idealisations they embody. When these conundra are revealed as what they are, namely
unsurprising offshoots of an idealised model, their metaphysical gravitas gives way to a
healthier, epistemic modesty.
Seeing representational vehicles as bounded is a simplifying assumption, one that
idealises away many of the intricate causal influences that parts of the cognitive sys-
tem effect on each other. This allows us to bring into focus in a tractable way the
crucial causal contributions that specific parts of the system make to the behaviour of
interest. Similarly, the separability between representations and their consumers is an
idealisation: it ignores the close interdependencies between most parts of the system,
simplifying its organisation so as to bring to the fore a useful distinction between dif-
ferent functional roles; distinction that does not exist in such a neat way in the actual
system, but that makes it more comprehensible and tractable. This also applies to types
of explanation that focus on coarse-grained functional and computational levels of de-
scription of cognitive systems, which beside idealisation also make use of abstraction to
bring into focus the relevant explanantia. These types of explanation tend to remain
non-committal about the vehicles that realise the posited functional or computational
structure, abstracting away from fine-grained physical details insofar as they are taken
to be of little or no relevance to their explanatory aims. In short, they abstract away the
details that impede appreciation of the explanatory causal pattern for the phenomena
they seek to explain, positing neatly distinguishable and functionally/computationally
bounded units and processes (Weiskopf 2017).
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These aspects of the representational model work as idealisations, rather than as
literally true of what is modelled. Even if it should turn out that such aspects of the
representational model never strictly apply to cognitive systems, that is, that repres-
entational vehicles never have clear boundaries, and can never be fully separated from
the subsystems that use them; they would still capture explanatorily relevant causal
features of cognitive systems. Idealised (and abstract) models can be explanatory, as
they reveal and bring into focus the subset of causal factors most relevant for explaining
a phenomenon of interest.
These two idealisations embodied in the cognitive representational model are mostly
due to the causal complexity of cognitive systems. Other idealisations may also be
partly motivated by our epistemic limitations. This is the case, I take, of determinacy
of content.
Deflationary realism invites a different take on the indeterminacy problems that
plague robust realist theories. The naturalistic substitutes to the content-fixing inter-
pretation practices of public representations are unlikely to be fully satisfactory replace-
ments. The complexity of the factors that underlie representational patterns is plausibly
such that no theory can fully account for them10. Many of the potentially relevant factors
are moreover epistemically opaque to us — we have very little epistemic access to the
details of the evolutionary history of cognitive systems, and we have little idea of what
entities in cognitive systems are candidates for standing in the relevant naturalistic re-
lations to things in the world. Given our epistemic limitations, our theories can only
capture those factors in a rather coarse-grained way, giving us at most an idealised,
partial grasp of the full story, which is though very often good enough for explanation
and prediction.
According to deflationary realism, indeterminacy of content stems from the attempt
to fit a complex system into a relatively simple model. The partial grasp on the relevant
10This is plausibly true of public representations as well. Much that calls for explanation is hidden
in the superficially straightforward notion of ‘interpretive practice’.
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cognitive workings that existing theories of representation provide, their limited focus on
one or some aspects that are relevant in bringing about representational patterns result
in content indeterminacies. Indeterminacy of content is the result of the limitations of
our models and of our knowledge; limitations that are unlikely to ever go away, given
the complexity of the systems modelled, the epistemic opacity of the relevant factors,
and the consequent partiality of our models. That indeterminacy of content marks
all our attempts at giving a realist theory of representation is not the expression of a
metaphysical problem, but rather a consequence of the adoption of an idealised model to
explain certain phenomena. Incompleteness and opacity notwithstanding, such partial
grasp over the workings of cognitive systems furnish helpful approximations of the core
aspects of what makes representational patterns possible.
In many cases, furthermore, determinacy of content may be one of the elements of the
representational model that match only very poorly its extended domain of application.
Imposing the requirement that contents be fairly determinate on relatively simple sys-
tems, such as the toy example of frogs’ tongue-snatching mechanism, can be misleading.
There may be no grounds for insisting that the mechanism represents either ‘fly’, ‘frog
food’, or ‘moving black dot’ — and similarly for other philosophical toy cases. These
are cases in which theorists have tended to commit to elements of the representational
model that do not approximate much anything in the systems under analysis.
The fact that the representational model, when applied to cognitive science, is an
idealised model does not hurt its explanatory value in explaining representational pat-
terns of behaviour. Ascribing determinate representational contents to internal states of
cognitive systems helps explain certain patterns of behaviour, even if those contents are
only idealisations. And even if the notion of representation only approximately captures
the properties of the cognitive states and processes responsible for those patterns, it iden-
tifies the relevant causal dependencies for explaining the latter. Representational posits
pick out some subset of the actual causal dependencies between entities and processes in
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cognitive systems and their environments — those focal to explaining representational
patterns — although without providing anything close to a true overall depiction. The
cognitive representational model possesses a feature typical of explanatory models: it
answers ‘what-if-things-were-different’ questions (Bokulich 2011, p. 43). Had the con-
tent of a representation as fixed by the model been different, the model would have
predicted specific changes in downstream processing and behaviour in light of that dif-
ference. If these predictions are investigated and shown to be empirically adequate,
they lend force to the claim that the model captures real causal dependencies relevant
to cognitive functioning, despite, or rather thanks to, the idealisations it embodies.
In sum, the representational model largely works in explanations in the cognitive
sciences because the model approximates many important features of actual cognit-
ive systems, without though being a perfect fit. We should thereby be realists about
cognitive representation, but in a way that concedes that what we are being realists
about is only approximately what our model posits. This is a modest form of realism:
one that recognises that we are on to something, and even have a pretty good idea of
what that something looks like, whilst also recognising that our model has limitations,
and that many aspects of the model cannot be precisely applied to the systems under
investigation.
6 Deflationary Realism as a Distinct Position
Where does this picture leave us for what regards the ontological nature of represent-
ation? At first glance, deflationary realism may look like a form of pragmatism or
fictionalism. We apply the representational model to cognitive systems because it is
a useful tool to explain certain interesting phenomena. But this does not require or
suggest that we should thereby commit to the actual existence of cognitive representa-
tions. They may be only fictions in an model, or part of a gloss which, albeit inevitable,
does not justify ontological commitment to its posits. What makes this deflationary
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model-based approach any different from those anti-realist positions?
Content pragmatism sees appeal to representation as part of an intentional gloss that,
while helpful in so far as it allows theorists to track and grasp the relevance of internal
computational states and process to the explanation of externalistically individuated
tasks, is not part of the theory proper. The latter has recourse only to computational
states and processes, representations being ascribed purely for heuristic reasons. In con-
trast, deflationary realism follows much contemporary philosophy of science in seeing
models and idealisations as part and parcel of scientific theorising: science is permeated
with idealisation, which is in most cases essential to theories, explanations, and pre-
dictions. As parts of an idealised model explanatory of certain specific patterns of
behaviour, representations are part of cognitive theories proper, and not a gloss external
to them.
The version of fictionalism closer to deflationary realism is Sprevak’s (2013). In the
picture he presents, representations are useful fictions, and scientific statements about
representation are not aimed at truth, but rather, at best, at truth-in-the-fiction (i.e.
in the idealised model). He even briefly considers understanding the pertinent kind of
fiction as scientific idealisation (p. 17). Inasmuch as idealised models are not literally
true of what they model, the representational model, when applied to cognitive systems,
may be seen as a fiction (Frigg 2010). It may therefore be argued that deflationary
realism is not really a form of realism, since what it invites ontological commitment to
are not cognitive representations per se — as they are part of an idealised model — but
rather different kinds of entity with which the latter share some properties. Cognitive
representations would thus be useful fictions: fictions because they do not really exist,
given their status as idealisations, and useful because they approximate actual states
and processes well enough to allow prediction and intervention.
Deflationary realism resists this conclusion. It admits that some features of the rep-
resentational model are idealisations, distortions of reality. But a proper understanding
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of the nature of scientific idealisation suggests that this does not preclude the represent-
ational model from capturing actual causal features of cognitive systems. As we have
seen, there are at least two ways of seeing the relations between idealised models and
reality that warrant ontological commitment to their posits: we can either take idealised
models to approximate truth well enough to justify ontological commitment to its posits
(Weisberg 2013); or we can take idealised models to capture the actual causal features of
the system that are most essential to explaining the phenomenon of interest (Bokulich
2011, Potochnik 2017). Accepting any of these views neatly distinguishes deflationary
realism from anti-realist approaches: both tie idealisation to truth sufficiently strongly
to resist the anti-realism about representations that fictionalism and pragmatism recom-
mend. Idealised models can be explanatory and reveal true causal features of modelled
systems.
Deflationary realism is superior to pragmatism and fictionalism inasmuch as it avoids
their main shortcoming. By keeping allegiance to realism, deflationary realism makes
clear why appeal to representation is so important, and possibly ineliminable, from the
cognitive sciences — a feat that pragmatism and fictionalism struggle with. The repres-
entational model captures those real causal features of cognitive systems that are more
directly causally relevant to explaining certain phenomena in the world: representa-
tional patterns. The causal role of cognitive representations remains thereby unscathed.
Consequently, there is no challenge to scientific explanatory principles: the close tie
between explanation and ontological commitment that the principle of inference to the
best explanation dictates is not put in jeopardy.
Finally, although I have underlined the differences between deflationary realism and
more robust realist accounts, I do not take this to indicate full incompatibility. Perhaps
robust realist theories can be read as providing partial representational models, and the
divergences between them as differences about which aspects of the causal structure of
cognitive systems, and their history, are given more emphasis. Under this deflationary
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light, the preferred natural relations that different robust realist theories appeal to are
some of the relevant factors underscoring the existence of representational patterns,
and consequently the value of representational explanation. This is the reading that
deflationary realism recommends11.
It is unlikely that this relatively modest view is what many robust realists are pur-
suing. The centrality given to indeterminacy of content problems, and the high stakes
ascribed to these debates as saving or sinking the prospects of naturalising represent-
ation and thereby of a naturalistic cognitive science, suggest that the aims of these
theories are more metaphysically ambitious. Moreover, debates between robust realists
have mostly taken the form of a fight between competitors, while deflationary realism
sees these theories as mutually compatible. To some extent deflationary realism is little
more than an invitation for metaphysical modesty, and for giving a larger role to epi-
stemic considerations when analysing the nature and role of cognitive representations.
Modest versions of existing realist views along the lines above are therefore not at odds
with deflationary realism, but are rather instances of it.
7 Concluding remarks
Before concluding, I would like to come back briefly to the dispute between representa-
tionalist and anti-representationalist views of cognition adumbrated in section §2. The
view I have been proposing has it that the representational model is an idealised, par-
tial model particularly suited to explaining certain patterns of behaviour. Given the
11This is in the spirit of Dennett’s (1991) professedly mild realist view. However, it differs from it in at
least three central aspects. First, Dennett’s target are propositional attitudes, i.e. personal level states
such as beliefs and desires, while the deflationary realism I propose targets mainly subpersonal states
and processes relevant to the cognitive sciences. Second, Dennett relies on claims about the nature
and features of what he calls real patterns, which need not be causal. In contrast, deflationary realism
relies on the epistemic practices of modelling and idealising in science, which are aimed at revealing
causal explanatory patterns and structures. Finally, he seems to suggest scepticism about internal
representational and computational vehicles. While deflationary realism remains non-committal about
many of the fine-grained features possessed by the states and processes that representations, as parts
of idealised models, capture or approximate, it does not embrace scepticism about representational and
computational vehicles.
25
complexity that marks cognitive systems and their interactions with their material and
social environments, it is inevitable that different research aims and methods lead to a
diversity of partial models, each bringing into focus one or a few explanatorily relevant
factors, contributing a part of the story of how cognition and intelligent behaviour are
brought about. Embodied and enactive approaches to cognition offer distinct models, in
light of often different explanatory aims. Representationalism, once seen under the light
that I recommend, is not incompatible with such approaches, which tend to downsize
or eliminate appeal to representations. Rather, we have a rich variety of partial models,
embodying different idealising assumptions and theoretical abstractions, all of which can
be legitimately explanatory. Representationalism and anti-representationalism are thus
not competitors, but candidates for pluralistic integration (Mitchell 2003)12.
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